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I. INTRODUCTION
While hedge fund activism has exploded in frequency and debate in recent
decades, the financial regulatory world is still adapting to the phenomenon.'
Designed to be subject to minimal oversight, hedge funds came under fire in
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and new rules required additional
disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").2
Scholarship on this topic often advocates for more effective reporting
mechanisms to disclose hedge fund acquisitions and holdings.3 But few
commentators consider that the disclosure requirements imposed by
regulations, particularly those pertaining to antitrust goals, are no longer
compatible with the reigning legal framework.4 A particularly stark example
of the failure of corporate law to keep up with activist investors is evident
when comparing the freedom the SEC permits hedge "wolf packs" with the
limitations the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") imposes on all activist
investors; the latter nullifying the benefits of the former. The 2016
enforcement of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act ("Hart-
Scott-Rodino") against hedge fund ValueAct Partners ("ValueAct") has
spooked many activist funds and prompted a discussion of the limits of their
abilities within the law.' This Note argues that the District Court for the
1. See Wulf Kaal & Dale Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the
United States, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2016/02/29/the-history-of-hedge-fund-regulation-in-the-united-states/
(detailing the advent of hedge funds as an exception to certain securities regulation and
the attempts since the 1980s hold them accountable to oversight rules).
2. Id. (outlining the new requirements imposed on hedge funds by Dodd-Frank
including disclosure of firm performance, risk metrics, and positions).
3. See Joel Slawotsky, Hedge Fund Activism in An Age of Global Collaboration
and Financial Innovation: The Needfor a Regulatory Update of United States Disclosure
Rules, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 275, 330 (2016) (recommending a lower share
purchase threshold to trigger hedge fund disclosure).
4. But see Dissenting Statement of Commissioners Maureen K. Ohlhausen &
Joshua D. Wright at 3, United States v. Third Point Offshore Fund, Ltd., 1:15-cv-01366
(D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2015), 121-0019, [hereinafter Ohlhausen & Wright Statement]
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/publicstatements/777351/150824thirdpoi
ntohlhausen-wrightstmt.pdf (suggesting that the FTC not require passive or activist
investors to provide notice and seek approval before purchasing ten percent or less of a
company's shares); BILAL SAYYED, A "SOUND BASIS" FOR REVISING THE HSR ACT'S
INVESTMENT-ONLY EXEMPTION, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1-2 (2013) (arguing that the
Hart-Scott-Rodino "investment-only" exemptions be replaced with a less burdensome,
less inclusive reporting threshold that more effectively screens actual anticompetitive
risks).
5. See Final Judgment at 4, United States v. VA Partners I, LLC, No. 16-cv-0 1672
(WHA), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016) (holding that the
defendants were enjoined from making a covered acquisition without filing and
observing the waiting period as required by Hart-Scott-Rodino).
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Northern District of California incorrectly approved the ValueAct consent
decree because it failed to consider the supremacy of securities law over
antitrust law in investor disclosure.6
II. THE SAME INFORMATION, DIFFERENT STANDARDS: ANTITRUST LAW
COMPETES WITH SECURITIES LAW
A. Hedge Fund Disclosures under the Williams Act and the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act
The Williams Act, enforced by the SEC, governs public disclosures
required by institutional investors, most notably 13(d) and 13(g) filings.7
The Williams Act was passed in 1968 and amends the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act ("Exchange Act").' Within ten days of acquiring five percent
or more of a company's stock, investors are required to file a 13(d) disclosure
statement.9 Under 13(d), investors must also disclose whether they acquired
the securities as a member of a group.' 0
Investors who do not intend to influence the decisions or direction of a
company, known as passive investors, are permitted to file a 13(g) when
acquiring more than five percent (but less than twenty percent) of a
company's stock." The intent of the Williams Act is to update investors on
holdings that could potentially impact a company.1 2 Since passive investors
are only holding the stock for purposes of investment and may not shape
corporate behavior, the 13(g) form requires less information.1 3 However,
6. Id. at 7.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2018).
8. Id.; see 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 11:2 (2018) (providing an overview of the Williams Act).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(e)(1).
10. See id § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(iii) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2018)) ("[A group
occurs] when two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or
other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an
issuer.").
11. Id.; see also Ethan A. Klingsberg et al., Active vs. Passive Investing: The Struggle
of2 Agencies, LAW360 (July 27, 2016, 1:13 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/821
83 8/active-vs-passive-investing-the-struggle-of-2 -agencies (noting that "passive"
investors qualifying for 13(g) status may still engage an issuer on certain corporate
governance issues when the investor is also engaging other issuers in its portfolio on the
same topics).
12. See Lloyd S. Harmetz, Frequently Asked Questions About Section 13(d) and
Section 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 1
(2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/faqs-schedule-13d-g.pdf (articulating that
disclosures provide transparency on potential changes in corporate control).
13. Id. at 3; see R. Christopher Small, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://corpgov.law.har
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like the 13(d) form, the 13(g) form must be submitted by passive investors
within ten days of the acquisition.1 4 Schedules 13(d) and 13(g) when filed
are made publicly available by the SEC."
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act amended the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.16
Investors are impacted by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act when acquiring
securities deemed sufficiently significant; they must notify the FTC of their
intent to purchase these securities and await FTC approval before
purchasing.' 7 Filings made to the FTC are not made public until approved,
unless an investor requests expedited review of securities acquisition
requests." The investigation period prior to approval generally lasts thirty-
days, although it could take longer if the FTC requests additional
information.' 9  Investors seeking to acquire ten percent or less of a
company's stock solely for the purposes of investment are exempt from Hart-
Scott-Rodino approval prior to purchase.20
While not codified, the FTC confines the "investment-only" exemption to
shareholder "passivity."2 ' Passive investors are only allowed to engage in a
narrow scope of activity before the FTC approves their securities purchase. 2 2
vard.edu/20 15/01/21 /passive-investors-not-passive-owners-2/ (explaining that,
officially, a passive investor can shape governance issues only in a very limited sense,
but that the effects of passive investors on corporate governance issues need further
investigation).
14. Harmetz, supra note 12, at 4.
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2018); FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 § 7A.02 (A.A.
Sommer Jr. June 2018 ed. 2018).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2018).
17. Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8524 (Jan. 26, 2017) (articulating the FTC's obligation to update reporting
thresholds as a percentage of an issuer and in dollar amount annually based on changes
in gross domestic product).
18. Lisl Dunlop & Shoshana Speiser, Merger Control in the United States:
Overview, THOMPSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (June 1, 2017), https://content.next.westlaw.
com/Document/Ieb49d8761cb51 1e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?contextDa
ta=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.
19. Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/premerge
r-notification-merger-review (last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9).
21. Id.; see Debbie Feinstein et al., "Investment-only" Means Just That, FED. TRADE
COMM'N (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-
matters/2015/08/investment-only-means-just (explaining that the "investment only"
exemption applies only to "purchasers who intend to hold the voting securities as passive
investors").
22. Rules, Regulations, Statements and Interpretations Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,465 (July 31, 1978) (noting
in background that while voting securities will not preclude an investor from claiming
"investment-only" exemption, the following behaviors will: "(1) Nominating a candidate
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Investors have long complained that the government's passivity definition is
unclear.23
In every case that the Department of Justice ("DOJ") or FTC has pursued
involving the violation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act "investment-only"
exemption, the subject of the allegations settles in the form of a consent
decree.24 These consent decree settlements follow procedures set by the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, also known as the Tunney Act. 25
Litigating under the Tunney Act is rarely a viable option for defendants given
the time commitment and the time sensitivity of securities purchases. 26
Further, the risk of the steep fines should the defendant lose in court often
plays a coercive role in the defendant's decision to settle. 27
for the board of directors of the issuer; (2) proposing corporate action requiring
shareholder approval; (3) soliciting proxies; (4) having a controlling shareholder,
director, officer, or employee simultaneously serving as an officer or director of the
issuer, (5) being a competitor of the issuer, or (6) doing any of the foregoing with respect
to any entity directly or indirectly controlling the issuer.").
23. See Barry A. Nigro, Jr., ValueAct Settlement: A Record Finefor HSR Violation,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 19, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/19/valueact-settlement-a-record-fine-for-hsr-
violation/ (explaining that there is no case law on the "investment-only" exemption so
investors must rely on guidance from settlements, speeches, and informal interpretations,
and noting that the broader application of the ValueAct settlement remains uncertain
since the government relies on the "totality of the circumstances" of investor behavior to
determine whether a violation has occurred).
24. See Scott E. Gant et al., The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act's First Amendment Problem,
1 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 1, 12 (2017). See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., COMMITMENT DECISIONS IN ANTITRUST CASES 3 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-other-international-competition-
fora/1606commitmentdecisions-us.pdf (explaining the consent decree process of
settling antitrust cases, which culminates in an agreement between parties, and "begins
with the filing of a complaint by DOJ in federal district court that alleges the theory of
harm and the relevant markets, along with a Competitive Impact Statement and a
proposed final judgment that the Division will ask the court to enter after the public
comment period.").
25. 15 U.S.C. § 16; see also The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.
ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last visited Feb. 14,
2019) (noting that both FTC and DOJ have complementary jurisdiction in antitrust
enforcement and divide investigations depending on the industry).
26. See William J. Kolasky, Jr. & James W. Lowe, The Merger Review Process at
the Federal Trade Commission: Administrative Efficiency and the Rule of Law, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 891-92 (1997) (arguing that firms usually settle by consent decree
because litigation costs too much and takes too long given that securities purchases are
time sensitive).
27. See Philip Goldstein, A Critique of the ValueAct Settlement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 5, 2016), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2016/08/05/a-critique-of-the-valueact-settlement/ (citing the severe
increase in civil penalties as the reason why ValueAct agreed to a consent decree, but
does not concede DOJ's allegations).
2019 101
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESSLAWREVIEW
The settlements are called consent decrees, and require the DOJ and the
FTC to publish a Competitive Impact Statement which details the DOJ's
views on the enforcement. 28 The DOJ and the FTC must technically allow
for a sixty-day public comment period before a district court may enter
judgment on a consent decree.29 Judges publish a decision on consent
decrees based on a public interest standard of review.30 This benchmark is
highly contentious for its alleged lack of clarity.3 '
Though judges overseeing Tunney Act proceedings rarely disapprove of a
proposed consent decree, they are permitted to exercise their discretion in
evaluating 1) the decree's competitive impact, and 2) the impact of the
decree "upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury."3 2
While the courts typically give extreme deference to the DOJ or FTC, the
intent of the 2004 revisions to the Tunney Act was to give judges little
flexibility.33
B. Williams Act & WolfPacks
The Williams Act created a loophole where shareholders can collaborate
without disclosing their holdings or united efforts.34 As long as investors do
not conspire to create formal agreements with other shareholders to act
28. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b).
29. See Ben James, Senators Say DOJIs Ignoring the Tunney Act, LAW360 (Sept.
28, 2006, 12:00 AM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/10947 (citing a letter from
members of Congress alleging that the DOJ allows mergers to go forward before the
formal completion of the Tunney Act process culminating in the sixty day review period
wherein the public may comment and the courts officially approve of the consent decree).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 16.
31. See Lawrence M. Frankel, Rethinking The Tunney Act: A Model for Judicial
Review of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 549, 550, 570 (2008)
(explaining that the purview of a judge when evaluating a Tunney Act consent decree is
vague despite a 2004 amendment that attempted to solidify a judge's evaluative
framework).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e); see also Rachel Frank, Comment, Still Mocking Judicial
Power?: Determining Deference Accorded to the Justice Department in Reviewing
Consent Decrees in Horizontal Mergers, 9 ELON L. REV. 171, 204 (2017) (noting that
while district court rulings on Tunney Act consent decrees do not have force of law they
still have some influence on precedent and provide direction to DOJ).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 16(g); see ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 24,
at 4 (stating that when considering a Tunney Act consent decree courts may not
"substitute its opinion on the best way to resolve the government's claims. . . .").
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(ii)(k) (2018); see David A. Katz, Section 13(d)
Reporting Requirements Need Updating, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 12, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/04/12/section-13d-
reporting-requirements-need-updating/ (citing a 2011 petition to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission that advances a ten-day disclosure window which would allow
investors to acquire a significant portion of stocks discretely).
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collectively and as long as an individual holds less than five percent of a
company's shares, investors can dodge group disclosures.35 This
phenomenon, known as a "wolf pack," is defined as "a loose network of
activist investors that act in a parallel fashion but deliberately avoid forming
a 'group' under section 13(d)(3) of the [Exchange Act]."3 6 These packs are
often driven by a "lead wolf' who sets the action plan for other shareholders
to follow; hedge funds often fill this lead role.37
Though not explicitly regulated in SEC rules, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit authorized wolf packs so long as they do not
collude for the acquisition of stock.38 John Coffee and Darius Palia, leading
experts on the wolf pack tactic and its evolution, analyzed recent court
rulings and found judges reluctant to find the existence of a group even when
a shareholder block clearly pushed the boundaries of prohibitions against
collectively acquiring and voting shares.3 9  Wolf packs are a highly
controversial vehicle that many stakeholders think cheat the Williams Act
instead of complying with it.40  Though the SEC is well aware of the
complaints about its reporting process, which is alleged to facilitate wolf
pack behavior, it has yet to change those disclosure rules. 4 1
35. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of
Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 568 (2016)
(explaining how wolf packs escape disclosure because the SEC sees "parallel action by
like-minded activist investors, even when accompanies by discussions among them, does
not, without more, give rise to a group for purposes [of disclosure].").
36. Id. at 562.
37. See Slawotsky, supra note 3, at 298-99 (explaining that a lead investor will
acquire five percent or more of a company and in the ten-day period before they must
publicly disclose their purchase will both continue to acquire stock and also let other
investors know of their activist plans; the end result is an informal shareholder block
which is aligned in activist intent but has not formed a formal agreement).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(ii)(k); CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. LLP,
654 F.3d. 276, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2011).
39. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 35, at 568 (listing the following types of
shareholder blocks that were found not to be a "group": (1) "two Schedule 13D filers and
a Schedule 13G filer. . . 'where one was a well-known raider and all three discussed
among themselves how to improve the value of the target company'; and (2) "a joint
slate of directors proposed by the investors").
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(ii)(k); see Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Request
for Rulemaking Regarding the Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules Under Section 13
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-624/4-624.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2019)
[hereinafter Comments on Rulemaking Petition] (discussing a 2011 petition to the SEC
to revise 13(d) disclosure timelines so that wolfpacks have less of an advantage to quietly
accumulate stock).
41. See Comments on Rulemaking Petition, supra note 40 (considering petitions but
not listing any official revisions to 13(d) disclosures).
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C. Credit Suisse v. Billings
Securities and antitrust law are often at odds in questions of corporate
noncompliance. 4 2 In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,43 the
Supreme Court questioned not whether securities or antitrust laws were
broken, but if they were reconcilable.4 4 Respondents brought a claim against
Credit Suisse arguing that the brokers colluded to drive up securities prices. 45
Antitrust and securities law came into conflict because, while initial public
offerings ("IPOs") are governed by securities law, the petitioners brought an
antitrust suit.46 The Court applied a four-part test to determine whether
antitrust law should not be enforced: 1) the issue is "squarely within"
securities regulations; 2) the SEC wields authority; 3) the SEC is actively
regulating; and 4) there exists "serious conflict" between the antitrust and
securities regulatory bodies.47 In holding that the antitrust laws did not
apply, the Court ruled that "antitrust action in this context is accompanied by
a substantial risk of injury to the securities markets and by a diminished need
for antitrust enforcement to address competitive conduct." 48
D. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Enforcement Against ValueAct Partners
In 2016, the DOJ issued a Hart-Scott-Rodino Act enforcement against the
hedge fund ValueAct for failure to qualify for the "investment-only"
exemption.49 This enforcement was not only the largest Hart-Scott-Rodino
"investment-only" penalty to date, but also the most stringent governmental
interpretation of passivity.o
The ValueAct complaint cited the fund's accumulation of stock in both
Baker Hughes and Halliburton, following the announcement of the planned
42. Is There Life After Trinko and Credit Suisse? The Role ofAntitrust in Regulated
Industries: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2010)
(statement of Howard Shelanski, Deputy Director for Antitrust, FTC) (detailing a long
history of litigation to determine when antitrust law applies to regulated industries, such
as securities).
43. 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
44. Id. at 267.
45. Id. at 269-270.
46. Id. at 268-269.
47. Id. at 274.
48. Id. at 284.
49. United States v. VA Partners, LLC, No. 16-cv-01672, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
163605, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016).
50. See Nigro, supra note 23 (noting that ValueAct penalty was close to twice as
large as the largest ever prior Hart Scott Rodino settlement); Klingsberg et al., supra note
11 (citing the ValueAct settlement as the potential spark of a new direction in shareholder
activism because the enforcement targeted communication between investors and
companies that is common practice).
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merger between the two companies. 5 ' The DOJ alleged ValueAct broke the
law by not 1) providing the government with notice of its intent to acquire
the stock, nor 2) observing the waiting period during which the government
would approve or deny ValueAct's request for purchase.5 2 According to the
DOJ, ValueAct did not meet the "investment-only" exception because it
intended at the outset to become involved in decision making at Baker
Hughes and Halliburton. 53 The consent decree that the DOJ reached with
ValueAct required ValueAct to abstain from a long list of communications
with entities in which they invested prior to government approval. 54
III. DISCLOSURE BEFORE VS. DISCLOSURE AFTER: ANTITRUST &
SECURITIES LAWS COMPETE
The ValueAct court made two fundamental errors in its judgment against
the hedge fund to allegedly violate the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.5 5 First, it
failed to recognize that Hart-Scott-Rodino interferes with the administration
of securities law by imposing a preemptive disclosure requirement on
investors who would otherwise be able to discretely make purchases under
the Williams Act.5 6 Securities law values the ability of investors to disclose
investments only after completion, as evidenced by the Williams Act and the
evolution of wolf packs which legally push the Williams Act's boundaries.5 7
The ValueAct court should have applied the test established by Credit Suisse
to find that Hart-Scott-Rodino cannot force investors to comply with
51. Complaint ¶¶ 3-4, United States v. VA Partners, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
163605 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01672).
52. Id. ¶ 19.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018); Complaint¶¶4, 12, 13, 16, VA Partners, LLC, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 163605 (No. 3:16-cv-01672) (arguing among the factors amounting to
ValueAct's failure to meet the exemption was their brand as an activist investor, and
communications with its partners and investors about plans to facilitate the Baker
Hughes-Halliburton merger).
54. See VA Partners, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605 at *4-5 (prohibiting
ValueAct from the following investor actions without government approval: 1)
suggesting a merger or acquisition; 2) suggesting a merger or acquisition in which
ValueAct holds a stake; 3) developing the terms of a public merger or acquisition; 5)
suggesting to the company modifications of corporate structure subject to shareholder
approval; and 6) becoming involved in strategy development pertaining to pricing or
production).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 18; VA Partners, LLC, 2016 LEXIS 163605, at *1.
56. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2018) (requiring disclosure of securities
acquisitions after purchase), with 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (requiring disclosure of securities
acquisitions prior to purchase and observation of a waiting period for FTC approval).
57. See CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d. 276, 278-
79 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that wolf packs may form without disclosure).
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disclosure requirements that undermine securities markets.
The court's second error was the failure to find that the DOJ's proposed
consent decree was not in the public interest and, therefore, should not have
been enforced. But for the confines of the Tunney Act,5 9 the ValueAct court
might have recognized that activist investors are an asset to antitrust
enforcement as well as corporate governance and performance, and
consequently would not have punished ValueAct's activism. 60
A. The Credit Suisse Test Part I: Hart-Scott-Rodino Interferes with
the Markets
Credit Suisse established that, when evaluating whether securities law and
antitrust law conflict, courts must analyze whether antitrust enforcement is
"accompanied by a substantial risk of injury to the securities markets and by
a diminished need for antitrust enforcement to address anticompetitive
conduct." 6' Looking at both ValueAct and Hart-Scott-Rodino through the
lens of Credit Suisse, a court would find that Hart-Scott-Rodino interferes
with securities law and market operations, and so is improperly applied to
pre-merger antitrust disclosure given its incompatibility with securities
disclosures. 62  Further, early disclosure prompted by Hart-Scott-Rodino
interrupts market operations by diminishing market returns. 63  Comparing
the freedom of wolf packs, at the extreme end of the permitted activity under
the Williams Act, with the oppressiveness of Hart-Scott-Rodino on all
activist investors highlights the market obstruction imposed by this particular
antitrust regulation on investors. 6 4  Hart-S cott-Rodino systematically
58. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279 (2007) (holding
that securities law preempts antitrust law when the two conflict).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a).
60. See Jos6 Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73(4) J.
FIN. 1513, 1541(2018) (discussing the positive antitrust behavior of activist hedge funds);
Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (finding that hedge funds provide benefits to shareholders
through their ability to influence and hold management accountable).
61. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 284.
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (requiring government approval and disclosure before
purchasing securities of a certain threshold); Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 284 (finding
antitrust law incompatible with securities law and thus inapplicable when enforcing the
antitrust law poses "a substantial risk of injury to the securities markets").
63. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 283-84 (holding that antitrust law cannot interfere
in the "efficient functioning of the securities markets" when securities law also governs).
64. See Leonard Chazen & Jack Bodner, Conscious Parallelism May Justify a Wolf
Pack Pill, LAW360 (May 27, 2014, 9:45 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/
540818/conscious-parallelism-may-justify-a-wolf-pack-pill (acknowledging that wolf
packs are a powerful tool which can help mitigate a target company's defenses against
governance reform).
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undermines the benefits afforded to investors by the Williams Act.65
Though the courts have never revisited Credit Suisse, its framework easily
applies in evaluating the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act given the contrast between
the SEC's intent66 and Hart-Scott-Rodino's oppressive impact. 67 The Court
held in Credit Suisse that the IPO process constitutes an activity "central to
the proper functioning of well-regulated capital markets." 6 8  It seems
straightforward to draw this conclusion when analyzing ValueAct's
securities activities or when one considers that Credit Suisse gave deference
to the IPO underwriters' marketing activities. Both of these actions are
analogous to communications between issues and investors, as regulated by
Hart-Scott-Rodino.6 9
Regarding purchase timing, a key element of securities markets, Hart-
Scott-Rodino deprives funds the stealth that the Williams Act affords wolf
packs and other investors; inopportune disclosure to the issuer can be a
significant disadvantage to investors.70 When filing a Hart-Scott-Rodino
disclosure, investors must choose whether they want to purchase securities
earlier, potentially when the market price and influence opportunity is ideal,
or wait and enjoy covert acquisition lest a public disclosure increase the stock
price and disrupt the firm's strategy.7 ' A court would find that, in this
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (requiring investors to disclose before purchase); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-l(a) (2018) (allowing investors to disclose after purchase); Lucian A.
Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activism Investors: Evidence and
Policy, 39 J. CoRP. L. 1, 17 (2013) (citing data which indicates that early disclosure
causes lower returns to investors).
66. See Robert G. Vanecko, Comment, Regulations 14A and 13D and the Role of
Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 376, 383 (1992)
(explaining the Congressional intent of the Exchange Act, which the Williams Act
amends, is to protect investors by requiring disclosures by market participants).
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (preventing investors from making a stock purchase at the
time of their choice, without issuer notification, and without government approval).
68. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 265.
69. Id. at 276 (stating the importance of marketing in the administration of an IPO,
governed by securities regulation, should not be obstructed by conflicting antitrust laws).
70. See Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-
Rodino on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences
Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 886 (1997) (arguing that
investors following Hart-Scott-Rodino and waiting for government approval of their
transactions "may also forgo other strategic opportunities-opportunities that may be
lost forever, even if the current transaction is ultimately abandoned."); SAYYED, supra
note 4, at 15-16 (noting that among the costs to investors imposed by Hart-Scott-Rodino
"include (i) the delayed implementation of efficiencies associated with an acquisition
[and] (ii) interference with the market for corporate control.").
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (requiring investors to seek government approval before
securities purchases of a certain size); see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, One Secret Buffet
Gets to Keep, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011, 9:24 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011
/1 1/14/one-secret-buffett-gets-to-keep/?mcubz=0& r=0 ("[T]he simple disclosure of an
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instance, antitrust law quashes the securities law advantage not only in
conflict but "overly deter[s] . . . practices important in" the securities
purchasing process.72
By comparison, the SEC recognizes the importance of investor freedom
by only mandating disclosure after stock purchases are complete, and by
giving a broader definition to "passive" investors which allows more
investor-issuer engagement without disclosure. 73  As exemplified by its
minimal speech regulation in proxy contests, the SEC has further prioritized
the liberation of investor-issuer communication.7 4 Under the Williams Act,
any investor is allowed to communicate with other shareholders and the
issuer, whereas the same investors under Hart-Scott-Rodino may not even
manifest the intent to influence the issuer, let alone communicate that
intent. 5 Given that the SEC has specifically addressed the flexibility it
allows in disclosure as compared to Hart-Scott-Rodino, a court would find
the Williams Act and Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in conflict.76
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires investors to give issuers notice of
their intent to purchase shares. Consequently, the law diminishes
investment would cause the price to rise so much as to scuttle [investors'] strategy.").
72. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285; see Ohlhausen & Wright Statement, supra note 4
(expressing concern that enforcement of Hart-Scott-Rodino against funds chills
shareholder advocacy).
73. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (mandating disclosure and a waiting period before
securities purchases), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (2018) (requiring disclosure after
securities purchases without a waiting period before purchasing). See generally Peter
Jonathan Halasz et al., Activism and Passivity: HSR Act and Section 13(d) Developments
for Investors, SCHLUTE ROTH & ZABEL (July 18, 2016), https://www.srz.com/images/
content/ 1/4/v2/146491/072816-Activist-Investing-Update-HSR-Act-and-Section- 1 3d-
Develop.pdf (explaining that shortly after the ValueAct enforcement was announced, the
SEC published guidance specifically articulating that failure to qualify as a passive
investor under Hart-Scott-Rodino will not necessarily preclude an investor for qualifying
as passive and thus eligible for 13(g) status under the Williams Act).
74. See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund
Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 687 (2007) (describing the SEC's
view of proxy contests, among the most important tools in shareholder activism, citing
significant flexibility among investors in how much they must disclose to the SEC and
when, which gives shareholders immense freedom in communication).
75. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (refraining from imposing communications
limitations between issuers and investors prior to securities purchases); Feinstein et al.,
supra note 21 (warning investors that expression of intent could jeopardize an investors'
claim of exemption under the "investment-only" rule).
76. See Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g) and Regulation 13D-G Beneficial
Ownership Reporting, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/divisi
ons/corpfin/guidance/regl3d-interp.htm (last updated July 14, 2016) (providing
guidance on 13(g) filing requirements, and allowing a broader spectrum of "passive"
shareholder behavior without disclosure than Hart-Scott-Rodino).
77. Richard B. Holbrook, Jr. et al., Over a Barrel: Strategic Considerations for
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securities enforcement as laid out in the Williams Act7' because it disrupts
activist hedge funds, widely recognized to be an asset to corporate
governance and market performance,79 giving issuers time to prepare
defenses against investor fund activism.so In 2015, the SEC provided further
evidence of its interest in maintaining investor advantages by declining to
shorten the disclosure timelines for companies making threshold stock
purchases pertinent to the Williams Act." The SEC seems to recognize that
not only do shareholders lose investment opportunities when forced to
disclose their intent to purchase under Hart-Scott-Rodino,8 2 but Hart-Scott-
Rodino deters the type of investors who enhance market returns.8 3
A court would also find a "clear repugnancy" between the timing of
communication that is allowed to investors as protected by the Williams Act
but undermined by Hart-Scott-Rodino.8 4  Whereas Hart-Scott-Rodino
prohibited ValueAct from communication about strategic goals with its
clients and even internal communications without FTC approval, courts have
held that shareholders holding a larger percentage of shares may freely
communicate and band together for a common goal, acting as a group of
theoretically unlimited size. 5 Further, under the Williams Act, investors
Investment Funds at the Crossroads ofAntitrust and Securities Law, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.bna.com/over-a-barrel-strategic-considerations-for-invest
ment-funds/?amp=true.
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (giving investors time in between a securities
purchase and the issuer's inevitable discovery).
79. Holbrook et al., supra note 77; Bray et al., supra note 60, at 1730.
80. Holbrook et al., supra note 77.
81. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 39; see Andrew E. Nagel et al., The
Williams Act: A Truly "Modern" Assessment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. 1 (Oct. 22, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/10/22/the-williams-
act-a-truly-modem-assessment/ (discussing reluctance to amend the Williams Act
disclosure timelines for fear that it would interrupt shareholder manager accountability
power).
82. See Bebchuk et al. supra note 65, at 17 (citing data which indicates that early
disclosure causes lower returns to investors).
83. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 81, at 49-50 (arguing that shortening
disclosure timelines will reduce the number of block shareholders which in turn will
reduce stock returns); Slawotsky, supra note 3, at 279 (noting that activist hedge funds
"gravitate towards badly managed companies, and without such activists, smaller
shareholders are powerless to remedy the situation.").
84. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275 (2007) (holding
that when there is a clear repugnancy between securities and antitrust law, securities law
supersedes); Complaint ¶¶ 1-6, United States v. VA Partners, LLC, No. 16-cv-01672,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01672)
(finding that communication with an investor of a certain threshold and the issuer without
government approval or disclosure violates the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act).
85. See CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 309 (2d Cir.
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may engage with a company free of disclosure as long as they hold less than
five percent of its shares.8 6
The Credit Suisse Court also noted that securities law preempts antitrust
laws when the securities law provides a "diminished need for antitrust
enforcement to address anticompetitive conduct.", 7 Critics of Hart-Scott-
Rodino point out that it rarely has a significant impact on preventing its
stated claim - anticompetitive behavior." If a court applied Credit Suisse's
emphasis on preventing antitrust litigation that interferes with the securities
markets, it would find that Hart-Scott-Rodino obstructs market efficiency by
giving companies opportunities to block activist shareholders that securities
law does not provide.89 A court would also be moved by the same fear
articulated by the Credit Suisse Court: "chilling" permissible securities
behavior due to a fear of antitrust violations. 90 The repugnancy is most clear
when comparing the freedoms allowed to a wolf pack and the restrictions on
an individual investor such as ValueAct. 9'
B. Credit Suisse Test Part II: The Four Factors Applied to ValueAct
Had the ValueAct court properly shed the Tunney Act confines, it would
have applied the long-held precedent that securities law preempts antitrust
law when the two conflict. 9 2  The Credit Suisse test aptly applies to
2011) (deregulating group formation for purposes of 13(d) disclosure).
86. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2018) (requiring disclosure only after the purchase
of five percent or less of an issuer's securities and without restriction on communications
between issuer and shareholder either before or after acquisition).
87. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 284.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2018); see SAYYED, supra note 4, at 15-16, 18 (discussing
the disproportional use of agency energy on Hart-Scott-Rodino filing review when most
filings present no anticompetitive potential, and only three percent of filings give the
FTC pause for further review, which is not to say those applications are not later decided
to be nonthreatening and approved).
89. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 282 (holding that the antitrust claims against securities
underwriters were incompatible with securities laws and thus inapplicable because the
antitrust laws "forbid[] ... a wide range of joint conduct that the securities law permits
or encourages. . .
90. Id. at 283.
91. Id. Compare CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 309
(2d Cir. 2011) (holding informal shareholder group coordination is permissible under
securities law), with United States v. VA Partners I, LLC, No. 16-cv-01672 (WHA),
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016) (holding that investors
who own a certain threshold of an issuer's stock may not communicate with the issuer
without prior government approval).
92. See William T. Reid IV, Comment, Implied Repeal of the Sherman Act Via the
Williams Act: Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 965, 971, 976 (1991)
(describing court history of antitrust preemption conditions with examples Silver v. Stock
Exchange, a 1963 case where the Supreme Court decided that "antitrust law could coexist
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ValueAct's behavior and sufficiently nullifies the prosecution under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act's "investment-only" exception. 93  ValueAct's
disclosures were "squarely within" the SEC's purview since ValueAct would
be required to report relevant purchases in its 13(d) filing. 94 The SEC would
penalize ValueAct for failure to report mandatory disclosures, as the one of
the Commission's primary functions is
"actively" regulating disclosures. 95 Further, the SEC has primary authority
in investor-company communication and over communications where an
investor may purchase securities, which are the two primary limitations
imposed on investors under Hart-Scott-Rodino.96 Applying this to the
ValueAct case, a court would likely find significant conflict between antitrust
and securities laws since the fund would have been entitled to purchase
without observing an approval waiting period, and could have also begun
engaging with other shareholders, at any time before or after acquisition,
without a company disclosure. 97 The latter element is particularly crucial
provided that the imposition of the former did not render the workings of the latter
ineffectual" and Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., a 1990 case where the Second Circuit held
"that applying antitrust laws to tender offers would upset the equilibrium of neutrality
among bidders, shareholders, and management that the Williams Act seeks to achieve.").
93. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 282 (stating that the involvement of antitrust courts in
securities matters "mean that the securities-related costs of mistakes is unusually high.").
94. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2018) ("Any person who, after acquiring directly
or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is specified
in paragraph (i) of this section, is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
five percent of the class shall, within 10 days after the acquisition, file with the
Commission, a statement containing the information required by Schedule 13(d)."
(emphasis added)).
95. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces Charges Against
Corporate Insiders for Violating Laws Requiring Prompt Reporting of Transactions and
Holdings (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-190 ("These
reporting requirements under . . . Section 13(d) or (g) of the Exchange Act apply
irrespective of profits or a person's reasons for acquiring holdings or engaging in
transactions. The failure to timely file a required beneficial ownership report, even if
inadvertent, constitutes a violation of these rules.").
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2018) (limiting interactions between investors and issuers
prior to securities purchase approval, also limiting the timing of an investor's securities
purchase); Mary Jo White, Chair, Soc'y of Corp. Sec'ys & Governance Prof ls, Building
Meaningful Communication and Engagement with Shareholders (June 25, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/building-meaningful-communication-and-
engagement-with-shareholde.html (ascribing the proxy process, which falls under the
SEC's regulatory authority, as one of the most important communication outlets between
shareholders and companies); What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, https://
www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last updated June 10, 2013) (describing the SEC's
authority over communication between investors and shareholders as well as the
conditions under which investors may purchase).
97. Compare United States v. VA Partners I, LLC, No. 16-cv-01672 (WHA), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605, at *7-9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016) (holding that an issuer may
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because ValueAct was denied the speech privileges under antitrust law when
the Exchange Act and SEC regulations clearly permit the same type of
communication.98
The Supreme Court in Credit Suisse emphasized that antitrust and
securities laws are clearly repugnant when they "produce conflicting
guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct." 99 Under
SEC regulations, but not FTC regulations, ValueAct can purchase stock at
the opportune moment of their choosing and influence management.' 00 If a
court evaluated a case with similar facts to ValueAct and applied Credit
Suisse, it would likely find that a hedge fund's ability to engage in activist
behavior "is central to the proper functioning of well-regulated capital
markets."'0 '
C. ValueAct's Competitive Impact
The Northern District of California wrongly decided ValueAct because it
neglected to properly consider the competitive impact of activist
shareholders.1 0 2  Hart-Scott-Rodino requires disclosure of securities
purchases above a certain threshold by non-passive investors, implying that
Congress believes active investors are more likely to stimulate
anticompetitive behavior.' 03 Pre-merger disclosure by activist investors is a
not even manifest intent to engage an issuer on management issues, let alone act on that
intent without government approval and disclosure of a securities purchaser), with 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b) (imposing only disclosure following a securities acquisition,
refraining from regulating investor-issuer speech prior to purchase).
98. Compare Complaint ¶ 26, VA Partners I, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605,
(No. 3:16-cv-01672) (citing meetings between securities acquirer and issuer without
government approval or disclosure as evidence of Hart-Scott-Rodino violation), with 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (mandating securities disclosure only after purchase, and does not
require issuer-investor communication preapproval).
99. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 264 (2007) (arguing
that antitrust law as applied in this case would chill "legitimate [securities] conduct" for
fear of antitrust lawsuits which would negatively impact the securities market).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (requiring securities purchasers to obtain approval before
the purchase is complete); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (requiring securities disclosure only
after acquisition).
101. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 276.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b); see Competitive Impact Statement at 10, VA Partners I, LLC,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605 (No. 3:16-cv-01672) (reiterating the standard which the
district court was required to evaluate the ValueAct consent decree, including "the impact
of entry of such judgment upon competition in the relevant market or markets, upon the
public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in
the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a
determination of the issues at trial.").
103. See Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements of 1976, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450 (July 31, 1978) (stating that the
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misguided attempt to enforce antitrust principles as demonstrated by the
ValueAct case which imposed significant consequences upon an investor
who did not pose an anticompetitive threat.1 04
Recent scholarship indicates that horizontal shareholding among large
institutional investors as opposed to activist hedge funds poses a significant
problem in antitrust.' 5 This emphasizes the absurdity of requiring activists
to seek permission before acquiring securities when passive investors do not
need pre-approval and are a greater threat to anticompetitive behavior.1 06
Research shows that the anticompetitive effects of horizontal shareholding
emerge without communication between shareholders and management,
again underscoring the purposelessness of restricting ValueAct's discussions
with Baker Hughes and Halliburton. 0 7
The government's allegations that ValueAct was attempting to facilitate
the merger of Baker Hughes and Halliburton remain unproven because,
Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger system "provides the enforcement agencies with advance
notice of, and information about, certain transactions, and with an opportunity to seek a
preliminary injunction in Federal district court to prevent consummation of any such
transactions which may, if consummated, violate the antitrust laws."); Feinstein et al.,
supra note 21 (noting that only non-passive investors as opposed to passive investors are
targeted for compliance with Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust disclosure).
104. VA Partners I, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605, at *1; see 15 U.S.C. §
16(b)(2)-(3) (requiring the government to provide an explanation of the anticompetitive
effect of entities it pursued for violation of antitrust laws); Martin C. Schmalz, How
Passive Funds Prevent Competition, ERIC POSNER BLOG (May 18, 2015), http://eric
posner.com/martin-schmalz-how-passive-funds-prevent-competition/ (contrasting an
activist hedge fund's advocacy for strategies increasing DuPont's competitiveness with
passive shareholder funds who voted against effort, presumably because competition did
not benefit them).
105. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REv. 1267, 1274
(2016) (synthesizing research which proves "anticompetitive effects arise from the fact
that interlocking shareholdings diminish each individual firm's incentives to cut prices
or expand output by increasing the costs of taking away sales from rivals.").
106. See Noah Smith, Passive Investing Might Not Be Great for Growth, BLOOMBERG
(July 10, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-10/
passive-investing-might-not-be-great-for-growth (citing researcher Antoinette Schoar
who argues that large diversified funds who are common owners are not a risk to antitrust
precisely because activist investors will rise above the larger funds and force companies
to focus on competition).
107. See Complaint ¶ 26, United States v. VA Partners I, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
163605 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01672) (stating that ValueAct's meetings
with Halliburton and Baker Hughes without disclosure and government approval
evidenced ValueAct's violation of Hart-Scott-Rodino); Elhauge, supra note 105, at 1274
(explaining that managers understand through publicly available information that their
shareholders also hold stock in competitors and make management decisions that benefit
horizontal shareholders because managers believe it is in their own best interest to heed
shareholder will; this is accomplished without coordination between managers and
investors).
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while ValueAct did purchase stocks in competing firms, there was no trial.'os
But, even if ValueAct had discussed the merger with both companies, the
proportion of its role as an influencer in a merger decision compared with
the burden of applying for securities acquisition does not justify the latter.' 09
Further, activist funds like ValueAct are more likely than passive index funds
to spur a company to be more competitive. "o
In ValueAct, the FTC had the opportunity to review the antitrust
implications and rejected the Baker Hughes-Halliburton merger before it was
complete."' But with little connection between its antitrust goals and
ValueAct, the FTC still fined them - a single investor in billion-dollar
companies - $11 million for possibly having discussions about a potential
merger.11 2 If the district court had properly analyzed the competitive impact
of ValueAct, it would have recognized that the consent decree did not
sufficiently demonstrate ValueAct's antitrust competitive impact." 3
Further, the consent decree was not in the public interest because it inhibited
the means by which activist shareholders bolster competition and market
108. VA Partners I, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605, at * 1; see Nigro, supra note
23.
109. See David Benoit, U.S. v. ValueAct: A Lawsuit to Define Activism, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 4, 2016, 7:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-sues-value
act-over-baker-hughes-halliburton-disclosures- 1459794637 (noting that as of its last
regulatory filings close to the time of DOJ's complaint against it, ValueAct only owned
5.3% of Baker Hughes and roughly 1.9% of Halliburton).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018) (implying that active firms pose a greater risk to
antitrust than passive firms since the two only passive investors are exempt from
premerger disclosure); Azar et al., supra note 60, at 7 (arguing that activist hedge funds
steward the competitive efforts of their issuers, finding that large institutional investors
have the opposite effect even if they are "entirely 'passive' in terms of corporate
governance (other than voting)").
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (authorizing the FTC to investigate any business for
compliance with antitrust laws); id. § 45(a)(1) (authorizing the FTC to prevent companies
from "using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."); Matt Levine, Sometimes It's
Hard for Owners to Talk to Companies, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2016, 2:38 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-13/sometimes-it-s-hard-for-owners-
to-talk-to-companies (arguing that Hart-Scott-Rodino may be helpful to the
government's antitrust agenda but it was unnecessary to apply it to ValueAct since it
ultimately blocked the Baker Hughes-Halliburton merger for reasons that had nothing to
do with ValueAct's communication with either company).
112. See VA Partners I, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605, at *1 (alleging no actual
antitrust violations against ValueAct but only finding them liable for failure to file a
disclosure form).
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)(a) (requiring the court to consider a consent decree in
light of its alignment with the public interest and impact on competition in relevant
markets).
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D. Correcting Course with Credit Suisse and the Public Interest
Standard
In the absence of the Tunney Act, the ValueAct court may have correctly
applied Credit Suisse to Hart-Scott-Rodino's impact on the timing of
securities purchase disclosures and found that it improperly interfered with
securities regulation." 5 The system through which the government lodges
Hart-Scott-Rodino complaints gives the DOJ and the FTC an oppressive
amount of power so that companies almost always settle through consent
decrees.1 6 The courts' "rubber stamp" authority under the Tunney Act has
created two legal obstacles in Hart-Scott-Rodino adjudication." 7  First, a
judge has never had the opportunity to offer a clear and consistent definition
of "passive investor.""' Secondly, a judge has never applied Credit Suisse
to Hart-Scott-Rodino cases involving alleged non-passive investors.119
However, if the public interest standard (as dictated by the Tunney Act)
must be applied, the district court in ValueAct should have recognized that
communication between shareholders and issuers is in the public interest
because it increases corporate oversight and competition. 2 0 In fact, one of
114. See id. § 16(e)(1) (requiring judges to determine whether a DOJ consent decree
is in the public interest); VA Partners I, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163605, at *1; see
also Azar et al., supra note 60, at 7 (finding activist shareholders benefit competition).
115. See also Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007)
(holding that securities law preempts antitrust law when they conflict). See generally 15
U.S.C. § 16 (limiting judicial discretion of DOJ consent decrees).
116. See JOSEPH G. KRAUSS ET AL., THE TUNNEY ACT: A HOUSE STILL STANDING,
THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 2 (2007), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/antitrustsource/JunO7_Krauss6_20fauthcheckdam.pdf (stating that the
2004 update to the Tunney Act was meant to broaden the judicial standard beyond the
previous evaluative benchmark that judges simply ensure that decrees do not mock
judicial power).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 16; KRAUSS ET AL., supra note 116, at 1.
118. See Further Guidance on the HSR Act Investment-Only Exemption for Seemingly
"Passive" Investors Engaging with Management, CADWALADER (Nov. 2, 2016), http://
www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/further-guidance-on-the-hsr-
act-investment-only-exemption-for-seemingly-passive-investors-engaging-with-
management (noting that because the ValueAct settlement does not offer perfect
guidance to investors, investors who identify as passive should reevaluate their approach
lest it unintentionally contradict the new precedent).
119. See Gant et al., supra note 24, at 12-13 (stating that an "investment-only"
allegation against an investor under Hart-Scott-Rodino has never been adjudicated in
trial).
120. See Ohlhausen & Wright Statement, supra note 4 (responding to the FTC's
enforcement against hedge fund Third Point for violating the "investment-only" Hart-
Scott-Rodino exemption saying, "we believe such a narrow interpretation of the
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the world's most powerful activist shareholders, Third Point, fought for more
competition during the Dow and DuPont negotiations which represented the
most significant merger in recent years and a big concern among antitrust
watchdogs.12' The ValueAct court was incorrect in finding that ValueAct's
communication with its stock issuers was not in the public interest and thus
further subverted public interest by failing to revise the passive investor
definition to reflect the positive impact of hedge fund activism.1 2 2 The more
accurate determination by the court is that the narrow definition of "passive
investor," as outlined by DOJ, has the potential to chill investor
communication with shareholders, which the court in Credit Suisse sought
to avoid.1 23 This is against the public interest as activist shareholders provide
an effective corporate oversight function which has anticompetitive spillover
effects and actually help the FTC in its antitrust goals.1 24
IV. READJUSTING THE BURDEN AND ACTUALLY ENFORCING ANTITRUST
While the DOJ may consider the ValueAct enforcement to be a boon in
catching anticompetitive behavior before it begins, its impacts have far more
negative results than positive.1 25  Congress should eliminate all pre-
'investment-only' exemption is not in the public interest" given that "the type of
shareholder advocacy pursued by [Third Point] here often generated well-documented
benefits to the market for corporate control.").
121. See Jack Kaskey, Third Point's Loeb Suggests Carving DowDuPont Into Six
Companies, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2017, 1:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/20 17-05-24/third-point-s-loeb-suggests-carving-dowdupont-into-six-
companies (describing Third Point's efforts to persuade Dow and DuPont to split into
six entities instead of three upon merging).
122. See Sims & Herman, supra note 70, at 885-86 (explaining that the transaction
delays caused by the Hart-Scott-Rodino disclosure process can negatively impact the
economy); see also Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 81, at 18-19 (citing evidence that
investors who hold blocks of shares, such as activist hedge funds, provides a critical
oversight function which enhances corporate governance).
123. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 283 (2007) (holding
that antitrust laws may be inapplicable when they could potentially prohibit behavior
otherwise legal under securities law); see also Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for
Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REv. 683, 706-07 (2011)
(articulating that the Credit Suisse decision was based on the Supreme Court's concern
that lower courts, when confronted with an antitrust claim, would not have the proper
securities law expertise and thus legal securities behavior will be deterred for fear of
antitrust challenges).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2018) (articulating Hart-Scott-Rodino's purview to intervene
in anticompetitive behavior); see also Hadiye Aslana et al., The Product Market Effects
ofHedge Fund Activism, 119 J. FIN. EcoN. 226,227 (2016) (finding that companies react
to the shareholder activism within rival companies by "not only by reducing prices but
also by improving their own productivity, cost and capital allocation efficiency, and
product differentiation").
125. See Sims & Herman, supra note 70 (detailing the discrepancy in costs to
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investment disclosure requirements from the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and
amend Hart-Scott-Rodino to serve instead as a consent doctrine whereby
investors understand that, with acquisition of stock, they will be subject to
antitrust scrutiny.1 2 6  Consequently, Congress would remove the FTC's
authority to review and reject securities purchases prior to completion.
Instead of pursuing proactive securities acquisition disclosures, Congress
should empower the FTC to perform reactive monitoring on acquisitions.
This new approach should parallel the approach taken by the SEC in insider
trading cases. 127 An amended Hart-Scott-Rodino should require the FTC to
analyze 13(d) disclosures and utilize big data capabilities to detect unusual
trading behavior that could have anticompetitive impacts. 128 The FTC can
use this information to employ advanced antitrust enforcement mechanisms
and focus agency resources on the entities merging, rather than on the
investors involved.1 29
V. CONCLUSION
The DOJ and United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, were incorrect in issuing the decision against ValueAct; the
District Court should have properly restrained the DOJ from applying
overly-restrictive limitations on investor communication which conflict with
securities laws. 3 0 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act interferes with investment
strategy and is incompatible with securities law, as exemplified by the
existence of wolf packs, in contrast to the FTC's restrictions on activist
investors. The ValueAct decision demonstrates the failures of the Hart-Scott-
investors in Hart-Scott-Rodino compliance compared to the actual antitrust results
produced).
126. See 15 U.S.C § 18 (prohibiting securities acquisitions of a certain threshold
without government pre-approval, subject to a discrete list of exemptions).
127. See Daniel M. Hawke, The SEC's "Trader-Based" Approach to Insider Trading
Enforcement, ARNOLD & PORTER (Sept. 13, 2006), https://www.apks.com/en/perspe
ctives/publications/20 16/09/the-secs-trader-based-approach-to-insider (detailing the
SEC's two approaches to insider trading investigations: the "security based" approach
which relies on news reports, tips, and events to identify trades made immediately before,
and the "trader based" approach which analyzes trading patterns in individual and
institutional investors).
128. See Reuters, Here's How the SEC is Using Big Data to Catch Insider Trading,
FORTUNE (Nov. 1, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/01/sec-big-data-insider-trading/
(describing the SEC's sophisticated trading analytical capabilities).
129. See How Mergers are Reviewed, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/media-resources/mergers-and-competition/merger-review (last visited Feb.
14, 2019) (outlining the merger review process wherein companies seeking a merger
over a certain dollar threshold must get approval before culmination).
130. United States v. VA Partners I, LLC, No. 16-cv-01672, (WHA), 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 163605, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016).
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Rodino review structure to properly adjudicate alleged violations.' 3 '
Therefore, it should be revised to minimize opportunity costs to shareholders
and align with the freedoms granted by securities law.' 32
131. 15 U.S.C. § 16.
132. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2018) (providing investors an advantage
in securities disclosure).
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